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The Federal Trade Commission has been through a remarkable
transformation. The story is now familiar: the agency was widely
regarded for much of its history as inept and ineffectual-preoccupied
with relatively trivial economic problems, strangled by procedural
delay and influenced, if not controlled, by a series of powerful rural
congressmen who dominated its appropriations and oversight com-
mittees.' The portrait is unquestionably overdrawn; at the Commis-
sion there have been, at all times, many able people and a good
number of significant and successful rules, reports, and cases. Nev-
ertheless, in broad outline it is true that the Commission, despite
its unusually formidable legislative authority, had failed for the most
part to realize its potential.
Then, in the 1960s, the agency began to change. New appoint-
ments to the Commission and to the staff generated a spirit of ac-
tivism and a willingness to study and often challenge what were
perceived to be major economic problems and consumer abuses.
This new activism was warmly welcomed in Congress, in the tan-
gible form of increased budgets and a newly enacted extension of
the agency's legislative authority, and by the public and the press.
Toward the end of the 1970s, the mood on the Hill darkened. Re-
sponding to increasing skepticism that government regulation can
solve most problems at an acceptable cost, many in Congress appeared
to conclude that the FTC had come too far too fast. In an intense
legislative fight, Congress considered a number of proposals that
would have curtailed sharply the Commission's authority.2 An even-
t Federal Trade Commissioner.
1. See E. Cox, R. FELL'MErH, & J. SCHULZ, "THE NADER REPORT" ON THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMI,,SSION 37-95, 129-59 (1969); REPORT OF THE ABA COMMISSION TO STUDY THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION 12-15 (1969) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT].
2. See, e.g., [Jan.-June 1980 Transfer Binder] ANTITRUST & TRADE REC. REP. (BNA)
F-i (May 1, 1980) (reproducing conference report to H.R. 2313, FTC Reorganization Bill,
reflecting compromises after several proposed amendments).
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tual compromise left the Commission's powers and projects almost
completely intact, but also left no doubt that Congress was con-
cerned over what the FTC's proper role should be.
I
In Regulatory Bureaucracy,3 Robert Katzmann has written a subtle
and intelligent study of the transition from the much criticized Com-
mission of the forties and fifties to the more activist and controversial
present agency. His concern is exclusively with antitrust policy. This
is somewhat unfortunate since Commission efforts in the consumer
protection field, such as its efforts to impose limits on business prac-
tices by funeral directors, used car dealers, and hearing aid salesmen,
have been politically controversial and recently have attracted close
congressional and public attention. Nevertheless, although it may be
more accurate and informative to view Commission policy in its mul-
tiple guises-consumer protection, antitrust, and economic studies-
a book with a narrower focus can provide valuable insights into the
development of policy in a regulatory setting.
This study of antitrust policy at the FTC comes at an auspicious
time. We may be witnessing the onset of some major changes in eco-
nomic regulation in this country; one issue for the 1980s is whether
and how antitrust's conventional principles will be reconciled to these
changes. New thinking about economic regulation responds to a grow-
ing recognition that the American economy is not doing very well.
Overall economic growth in the 1970s is down almost a third from
the 1960s, 4 innovation is lagging,5 productivity increases are down
from those of the late 1960s,O and there is solid reason for concern
about the ability of the United States to compete effectively abroad.7
3. R. KATZMANN, REGULATORY BuREAucRAcY (1980) [hereinafter cited by page number
only].
4. Annual increases in the gross national product in constant 1972 dollars averaged
4.2% in the 1960s but only 2.9% in the 1970s. EcoNouc REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 204-05
(1980) (table B-2).
5. One sign of lagging innovation is that annual dollar investment in industrial re-
search and development has remained roughly constant for over a decade and has de-
clined from 2.1% of the gross national product in 1964 to 1.6% in 1978. See ECONONISC
REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note 4, at 204 (table B-2) (gross national product fig-
ures); NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, NATIONAL PATrERNS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
RESOURCES 25, 29 (1980) (investment figures).
6. Output per hour worked increased by about 3.2% per year in the period 1948
through 1968, but increased by only about 2.2% in the period 1968 through 1973 and
0.7% in the period 1974 through 1979. ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT, supra note
4, at 247 (table B-38).
7. For example, imports of foreign autos will account for approximately 27% of the
auto sales in the United States in 1980, based on the first four months, compared to
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With things going so badly it is inevitable that people begin to pro-
pose modifications to the accepted ways the economy is regulated.
A first reaction led to deregulation of rate and entry (at the CAB,
ICC, SEC) and, more importantly, to an increasing tendency within
government to adopt regulatory mechanisms more consistent with a
free market philosophy." But rate and entry regulation have probably
never affected more than fifteen percent or so of the gross national
product.2 The broader plea to eliminate misguided regulatory systems,
"getting the government off business' back," may solve some prob-
lems, but is increasingly perceived as an inadequate solution to others.
More far-reaching changes are likely if business, labor, and govern-
ment regulators come to agree that problems of industrial growth, in-
novation, productivity, and foreign trade can only be remedied through
new institutional arrangements such as expanded government, busi-
ness, and labor cooperation. In a new world of "reindustrialization,"
auto, steel, drug, and chemical manufacturers will seek not only sub-
sidies, import quotas, and tax breaks, but also exemptions from tra-
ditional antitrust limitations on cooperation and merger in order to
meet the competition of government-sponsored foreign industries. This
will trigger a reevaluation, already begun to some extent, of the future
role of antitrust. Of course, even now, free market incentives, backed
by antitrust enforcement, are rarely relied upon entirely in any mar-
ket. Assorted elements of competition policy, government regulation,
and authorized industry self-regulation always exist, and there is a
constant tension between these policies and shifts of emphasis. When
things appear to be going badly, there is likely to be a reappraisal.
The last time this country lost confidence in the ability of free mar-
ket incentives to achieve economic goals was in the 1930s, and we
then experimented rather unsuccessfully with government-business
planning through the NRA. 10
If we are in for a world of increased government participation in
the industrial process, a major challenge will be not only to see that
antitrust and consumer interests are not forgotten in the process of
government, business, and labor collaboration, but also to work out
15.2% in 1970. SUBCOMM. ON TRADE OF THE HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 96TH CONG.,
2D SEss., AUTO SITUATION: 1980, at 27 (Comm. Print 1980). The United States' share of world
exports of medical and pharmaceutical products has fallen from 27.6% in 1962 to 16.9%
in 1979. Bus. WEEK, June 30, 1980, at 60.
8. See Breyer, Analyzing Regulatory Failure: Mismatches, Less Restrictive Alternatives,
and Reform, 92 HARV. L. REv. 547, 589-90 (1979) (airline industry inefficiency one reason
for deregulation by CAB).
9. See Jones, An Example of a Regulatory Alternative to Antitrust: New York Utilities
in the Early Seventies, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 462, 465 n.1 (1973).
10. See, e.g., A. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEw DEAL 87-176 (1959).
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how antitrust concerns can be reconciled with new types of coopera-
tion. One of the reasons antitrust policy has been able to adjust to
immense economic changes for almost a century is its considerable
flexibility, and specifically its capacity to decide what an "unreason-
able restraint" is by balancing a wide variety of competitive and other
concerns. Antitrust's rule of reason is already sufficiently flexible to
incorporate, if need be, considerations of innovation, productivity,
and foreign trade as well. For example, the rule of reason could al-
low modification of conventional antitrust enforcement principles
when the transaction relates primarily to joint research or to doing
business in foreign markets. Indeed, if prosecutorial discretion is taken
into account, these considerations already are a fact of "antitrust law,"
at least when enforced by the government. But this kind of readjust-
ment, preserving the right mix of antitrust, government regulation,
and free market incentives, will not just happen. It requires a com-
plete knowledge of how markets operate, an understanding of com-
peting foreign systems, a realistic conception of the values antitrust
and other economic policies are intended to serve, and development
of rules and guides indicating how and in what circumstances con-
ventional principles can be altered.
The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice, because it
is part of the executive branch, inevitably will play a key role in any
reevaluation process. But the FTC, although it has prosecutorial au-
thority roughly coextensive with that of the Department of Justice,
has the capacity to do more. It has a cadre of economists integrated
into its planning and enforcement activities, and it has investigative
and advisory authority that goes beyond simple prosecution. It could
be in a position to contribute to a coordinated approach to these
problems, indeed, to become a "trade" agency in the broadest sense,
as envisioned by some of its sponsors in 1914.11 The role the Com-
mission has played in recent years-sponsoring legislative initiatives,
issuing reports to Congress, proposing model state legislation, con-
ducting economic studies, and intervening to assert free market and
consumer interests in other regulatory agencies such as the ICC and
Department of Energy (all in addition to its usual prosecutorial work)
-indicates a capacity to play this crucial role.
II
Although there is an opportunity for the FTC to play a part in any
reassessment of antitrust, the agency's record since 1914 of antici-
11. See G. HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 18-19, 24 (1924).
729
The Yale Law Journal
pating the direction of economic policy is not encouraging. More
often, it doggedly challenged practices on theories of absolute lia-
bility that, according to legal and economic scholarship and the com-
mon consensus, deserved a more discriminating review. Perhaps an
indication of the FTC's capacity to respond to a changing regulatory
context can be discovered in the major conversion of the Commission's
antitrust policy in the late 1960s, which is carefully studied and docu-
mented in Regulatory Bureaucracy.
Antitrust policy's most significant and worthwhile effects on the
economy have occurred as a result of the successful enforcement of
rules that prevent price fixing and market-division cartels among
large firms, and rules that prevent horizontal and near-horizontal
mergers from producing increasing levels of industrial concentration.
Unfortunately, the early FTC was largely active in other parts of the
forest. Motivated by a vague populist view that big companies could
"leverage" their market power and thereby suppress competitive op-
portunities of smaller businessmen,12 the Commission, year after year,
devoted the lion's share of its resources to a literalistic interpretation
of the Robinson-Patman Act outlawing various forms of price dis-
crimination. 13 For similar reasons, it brought many cases challenging
tie-in sales and exclusive dealing arrangements on the theory that
they contributed significantly to the power of dominant companies
to maintain their market position, a view of vertical foreclosure shaken
in exhaustive legal and economic scholarship.14 Finally, it challenged
a variety of unfair and rather insignificant competitive practices un-
der the catch-all provisions of section 5 of the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act, including payola,' 5 trade disparagement,' 6 and misrepre-
12. For an expanded version of this discussion, see Pitofsky, The Political Content
of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051 (1979).
13. 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976). A survey by Professor Posner found that approxi-
mately 89% of the 614 competition cases initiated by the Commission from 1960 through
1964 involved straight Robinson-Patman Act charges, excluding allegations of predatory
pricing. From 1965 through 1969, the corresponding figure was 57%. See Posner, A Sta-
tistical Study of Antitrust Enforcement, 13 J.L. & ECON. 365, 369, 370 & n.9 (1970). By
contrast, during the period 1975 through 1979, only six percent of the adjudicative com-
plaints and investigative-stage consent orders issued by the Commission in the competi-
tion area alleged Robinson-Patman Act violations. See FTC, FEDERAL TRADE COaNMISSION
AccoMPLISHsENTs, FISCAL YEARS 1975-1979 (1980). A six percent commitment probably
reflects an over-reaction, and that figure will be somewhat higher for this year and next.
14. See, e.g., Bork, Vertical Integration in the Sherman Act: The Legal History of an
Economic Misconception, 22 U. CH. L. RFv. 157 (1954); Bowman, Tying Arrangements
and the Leverage Problem, 67 YALE L.J. 19 (1957).
15. See 2 TRADE R G. REP. (CCH) 7903 (1971) (listing payola and commercial bribery
orders).
16. See, e.g., FTC v. Keaton Tire & Rubber Co., 5 F.T.C. 335, 342-43 (1922) (firm's
characterization of automobile parts competitor as "pirate"); Morse, 47 F.T.C. 258, 271-72
(1950) (company's charge that competing encyclopedia contained outdated facts).
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sentation of product content and origin.17 On the plus side, it did
achieve a measure of respect after 1950 through successful efforts to
develop the law governing conglomerate mergers,18 and its economic
studies and reports were influential and almost always professionally
sound.
A turning point occurred in the 1960s. After the FTC's previous
performance had been bitterly criticized by the first of the Nader's
Raiders groups,' and that criticism supported in part by a special
American Bar Association Commission,2 0 new leadership set out to
remedy what they regarded as the errors of the past. Regulatory
Bureaucracy is largely a comparative description of pre-1968 and post-
1968 Commission procedure and practice in the antitrust area.
It is interesting to compare "reform" opportunities in 1968 on the
consumer protection and antitrust sides of Commission enforcement.
In traditional areas of consumer protection-advertising and credit
practices, information disclosures, marketing frauds-many believed
that the Commission had been preoccupied by trivial practices, that
its remedies had been inadequate, and that it had generally failed to
recognize the interplay of free market competitive considerations and
outright protection of consumers.21 Actually, the Commission had
taken on some very tough issues in the fifties and sixties-the cigarette
health warning was a leading example-and had laid the groundwork
for many of the innovative cases, rules, and remedies later attempted.
But there was still a natural agenda of unaddressed issues, developing
out of the 1960s consumer movement, which formed a nucleus of
"reform" projects. There was also support in Congress and the press
for innovative remedies and new legislative authority. The Bureau of
Consumer Protection, riding on the then strong tide of consumerism,
had little difficulty developing a program that was at once activist,
17. See, e.g., Waltham Watch Co., 64 F.T.C. 1150, 1164-65 (1964) (prohibiting use of
"Waltham" to designate watches without statement of country of origin of each com-
ponent not made entirely in United States); Colognes, Inc., 59 F.T.C. 872, 876-77 (1961)
(prohibiting sale of cologne in bottles of size usually used for perfume without conspicu-
ous statement of contents).
18. See, e.g., FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967) (appearance of more
dominant acquirer in oligopolistic industry is anticompetitive under § 7 of Clayton Act);
FTC v. Consol. Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965) (reciprocal buying after acquisition
is anticompetitive under § 7 of Clayton Act); Bendix Corp., [1970-73 Transfer Binder]
TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 19,288 (1970), rev'd on other grounds, 450 F.2d 534 (6th Cir.
1971) (acquisition by firm in closely related market lessens likelihood acquirer will enter
acquiree's market and is anticompetitive).
19. See E. Cox, R. FLLsEIn-, & J. SCHuLZ, THE CONSUMER AND THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (1969).
20. See ABA REPORT, supra note I.
21. See E. Cox, R. FLLaMETH, & J. ScHuLz, supra note 1, at 37-95; ABA REPORT, supra
note 1, at 36-64.
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attention getting, and widely, though of course not universally, re-
garded as worthwhile.
In 1968, there was also a plausible antitrust agenda for an activist
program by the Bureau of Competition that did not depend on a
purely populist, small-business-oriented view of the competitive pro-
cess. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, although interpreted in the courts
to impose fairly strict limits on permissible behavior by monopolists,
had been left largely unenforced since 1950.22 Similarly, sophisticated
observers of antitrust law had noted the possibility that there might
be certain kinds of oligopolistic behavior, extremely anticompetitive
in effect and lacking any plausible business justification, that might
be considered illegal regardless of the absence of evidence of outright
agreement. 2a Beyond these major but lingering "structural" questions,
there was a good deal of single-firm conduct by nonmonopolists that
had been regarded with concern, but left virtually unchallenged since
World War Two. Part of the problem was that the attempt-to-monopo-
lize clause of the Sherman Act, which could have been applied to
plainly anticompetitive conduct by dominant single firms falling short
of monopoly power, was also largely unenforced. As with monopoliz-
ing conduct, the definition of "predation" necessary to make out an
illegal attempt-in pricing, plant expansion, accumulation of patents
-remained extremely unclear in the few existing judicial decisions.
2 4
Finally, although Congress and the courts had clearly reached a judg-
ment against the legality of vertical price fixing, there was reason
to believe that a good deal of indirect resale price maintenance was
occurring, and that nonhorizontal mergers with occasional, though
elusive, anticompetitive effects were on the increase in the economy.
There was, then, an agenda, but it was in no way comparable to
the decades of advertising fraud and marketing abuse by national
companies that abruptly began to be challenged by the Bureau of
Consumer Protection. Every one of the antitrust issues that the Com-
mission addressed in the 1960s involved competing values and thus
22. Although the main outlines of a section 2 violation had been established in
United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), and United
States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295 (D. Mass. 1953), aff'd per curiam,
347 U.S. 521 (1954), case enforcement was rare. See Bodner, Monopolization and At-
tempts to Monopolize: Whatever Happened to Section 2? 41 A.B.A. ANTITRuST L.J. 589,
592 (1972) (introductory remarks to panel discussion); Cox, Competition and Section 2
of the Sherman Act, 27 A.B.A. ArrRusT L.J. 72, 72 (1965).
23. See, e.g., Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies,
82 HARv. L. RiEv. 1207, 1225-31 (1969).
24. See Cooper, Attempts and Monopolization: A Mildly Expansionary Answer to the
Prophylactic Riddle of Section 2, 72 MICH. L. REv. 373, 435-40 (1974); Turner, The Scope
of "Attempt to Monopolize," 30 REC. A.B. CITY N.Y. 487, 493-94 (1975).
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an over-aggressive enforcement effort would be likely to do more harm
than good. To take an obvious example, if the Commission chose to
try to expand the definition of "attempt to monopolize" so as to limit
permissible pricing or corporate expansion too restrictively, the re-
sult would be a net loss to competitive markets of the beneficial
effects of aggressive product improvement by large but not yet dom-
inant firms. Moreover, when innovative enforcement projects involved
major structural problems, that is, issues of monopoly and shared oli-
gopolistic behavior, they generated cases of incredible length and
procedural complexity. Finally, after nearly twenty years during which
the Supreme Court had almost automatically ratified any government
enforcement initiative, the government in the 1970s found itself los-
ing many of its major antitrust cases. Thus, while the Commission
and its senior antitrust staff were under some pressure to replicate
the activist program on the consumer protection side, when they did,
they found themselves embroiled in long and complex battles.
III
Despite the difficulties, the Commission, in the years following 1970,
did initiate significant antitrust actions against major corporations,
including the oil, automobile, breakfast foods, drug, and office-copier
industries.2 5 Unquestionably, the present Commission is far more will-
ing than its forebears to take on major economic problems and ma-
jor corporate interests. This period of heightened antitrust activity,
accompanied by a doubling and tripling of its antitrust budget, has
been accompanied and caused, to some extent, by major institutional
changes within the agency. Regulatory Bureaucracy analyzes these
changes, measures the extent of the departures from the institutional
arrangements of previous Commissions, attempts to understand the
reasons why they have occurred, and discusses the likelihood that they
will endure.
The major categories of change that Katzmann examines are shrewd-
ly chosen: departures in the method of case selection and, as a result,
changes in the type of cases the agency has been bringing; an in-
crease in the influence of economists in an agency traditionally dom-
25. See, e.g., Eli Lilly & Co., 3 TADE: REG. REP. (CCH) 21,612 (1980) (pharmaceutical
industry); Investigation of the Automobile Industry, File 761 0083 (compulsory process
resolution, Aug. 2, 1976) (on file with FTC) (automobile industry); Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C.
361 (1975) (office-copier industry); Exxon Corp., [1973-1976 Transfer Binder] TRADE REG.
REP. (CCH) 20,388 (1973) (oil industry); Kellogg Co., [1970-1973 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (CCH) 19,898 (1972) (breakfast food industry).
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inated by lawyers; an increase in the ability of the agency to attract
abler, better qualified staff; and subtle changes in the roles of Com-
missioners, bureau chiefs, and staff in influencing and controlling
agency direction. Katzmann adds a final chapter on why such pro-
found changes occurred and what we are likely to see in the years
ahead. Throughout his analysis, he is unusually alert to the possibility
that the nuts and bolts of the regulatory world-bureaucratic structure,
budgetary and management planning, the interplay of career objec-
tives among attorneys and economists-may influence and even con-
trol the substantive output of the agency.
Katzmann understands that the nature of a law enforcement pro-
gram is determined by case selection values, and he detects, accurately
I believe, a significant difference in case selection in the pre-1968 and
post-1968 Commission. In the earlier period, the agency pursued, in
Katzmann's word, a "reactive" approach that relied on mail bag com-
plaints, frequently forwarded by influential congressmen, as a source
of investigations. 26 The approach produced large numbers of cases
of modest scope designed to deter or punish particular kinds of busi-
ness behavior. In a vintage year, in the fifties and early sixties, the
Commission would bring over a hundred Robinson-Patman Act price
discrimination and Clayton Act vertical distribution cases, mostly trig-
gered by letter complaints from disadvantaged businessmen; in the
same years, it rarely could manage to find and challenge directly
questionable instances of monopolistic or oligopolistic behavior by
large firms. Part of the reason related to infirmities, real and per-
ceived, in the Commission's remedial authority. Lacking authority
to impose criminal sanctions, the FTC sensibly shied away from chal-
lenges to outright price fixing and market division cartels, leaving
that work for the most part to the Department of Justice. Moreover,
for many years prior to 1965, the Commission was influenced by an
old Supreme Court decision, 27 subsequently rejected,2 8 that indicated
that the Commission lacked authority to impose structural relief, such
as divestiture, even if it successfully challenged an illegal monopoly.
But beyond that, the Commission stuck to manageable conduct cases
because it believed that was the job Congress wanted it to do. Those
cases produced visible and relatively prompt results, and enabled the
Commission to avoid resource-intensive life and death struggles with
giant corporations or major industries.
26. Pp. 27-31.
27. FTC v. Eastman Kodak Co., 274 U.S. 619 (1927).
28. See Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296, 312, 313 &
n.17 (1963).
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Katzmann records that, beginning in the late 1960s, the Commis-
sion moved to a "pro-active" approach in which the Bureau of Compe-
tition attempted to identify serious structural problems in the economy,
usually signaled by high concentration, high profits, and formidable
barriers to entry.29 A decade devoted to seeking out this sort of am-
bitious and innovative caseload has left the current Commission in
strenuous and prolonged litigation battles.
Has the shift toward the pro-active approach made a difference?
It is probably too early to tell. As Katzmann notes, this approach in
the hands of its more thoughtful advocates never sought a docket of
exclusively structural cases, but rather was a reaction against earlier
techniques that ignored some of the most serious problems in major
sectors of the economy. That much seems to have been achieved. Still,
the test of a successful pro-active program is not whether the agency
has the will to take on "Big Problems," but whether it has the skill
to select sensible targets, draft solid complaints, and litigate success-
fully against battalions of the ablest defense lawyers in the country.
So far, a decade of litigation has produced considerable evidence of
dedication (some would say zealotry) 3 0 but only modest results; 3 '
the jury is still out on the Commission's most ambitious efforts. Un-
fortunately, the jury may be old and gray before the experiment is
over. For example, Katzmann reports that the Commission case against
the major United States oil companies, initiated in 1973, has used
twelve to fourteen percent of the agency's annual antitrust budget
for almost a decade, and that the case is still in an early stage of
discovery.32
A second facet of bureaucratic change examined by Katzmann re-
lates to recruitment and the interplay between attorneys and econo-
mists. At the staff level, the FTC has been in transition. Regarded
as a hot agency since 1968, it has attracted the ablest young lawyers
and economists. Interestingly, Katzmann records that of 170 attorneys
who were on the payroll of the Bureau of Competition in 1975, only
20 were there before 197033 a transition pace rarely, if ever, dupli-
cated in other regulatory agencies. There is a downside to the Com-
29. Pp. 31-33.
30. Gellhorn, The Wages of Zealotry: The FTC Under Siege, REGULATION, Jan.-Feb.
1980, at 33.
31. The Commission settled monopolization proceedings against Xerox and Eli Lilly
with orders compelling the licensing, on a royalty-free basis, in part, of significant pres-
ent and future patents and know-how. Eli Lilly & Co., 3 TRADE REG. Ra'. (CCH) 21,612
(1980) (insulin); Xerox Corp., 86 F.T.C. 364 (1975) (office copiers).
32. Pp. 30, 126.
33. P. 77.
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mission's successful recruitment efforts. Because government pay and
attorney support services are inferior to those that major law firms
offer and because slow-moving structural cases tend to erode morale,
the agency's turnover rate is high.
Katzmann also cites as a reason for rapid turnover the absence of
"passionate conviction" about the goals of antitrust policy,34 but I
am not sure he is right. Passionate conviction is difficult to measure,
but Commission meetings, and intra-staff differences, have seemed
fairly intense to me. In any event, the goals of antitrust at the De-
partment of Justice are said to be about the same as the goals of anti-
trust at the FTC, and its turnover rate, although high, is not at the
FTC's level. Whatever the reasons, the Commission so far, with some
notable exceptions, has not developed, as successfully as has the De-
partment of Justice, a cadre of experienced trial attorneys who make
a career of public service. Unless the courts are going to bail out
government lawyers in antitrust cases, as they did to some extent in
the Warren Court years,35 legitimate government enforcement efforts
will continue, on occasion, to be lost when bright, hard-working, in-
experienced lawyers representing the government litigate against bright,
hard-working, experienced attorneys from the private bar.
Katzmann reserves some of his most thoughtful comments for that
hybrid aspect of Commission structure whereby lawyers and econo-
mists merge their talents. The Bureau of Economics itself performs
two quite different, and some would say conflicting, regulatory func-
tions. The Division of Economic Evidence advises the Commission on
case selection and supports the legal staff in its case enforcement ac-
tivities. The Divisions of Industry Analyses and of Financial Statistics
have wide authority to collect statistics (including supervision of the
FTC's controversial line-of-business program which discloses aggregate
profitability in different sectors of the economy), and also publish
occasional reports and studies on important economic issues. In the
Bureau's past, the report and study function was probably paramount;
the economic staff, largely excluded from case development, issued
influential reports such as those that initiated the creation of the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission and led to the reconsideration and
34. P. 81.
35. See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 301 (1966) (Stewart, J., dis-
senting) ("The sole consistency that I can find is that in litigation under § 7, the Govern-
ment always wins."); United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 609
(1957) (Burton, J., dissenting) (Court used § 7 of Clayton Act to uphold government claim,
although case had focused on Sherman Act issues for its eight-year life).
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eventual amendment of section 7 of the Clayton Act, the section cov-
ering mergers.3 6
More recently, the Bureau of Economics has achieved much greater
influence in policy planning and case selection. This increased role
has led to some lively disagreements. Economists tend to be more
confident of free market solutions to economic problems and skeptical
of conduct cases that attempt to preserve small business units despite
their inherent inefficiencies. As a result, economists are rigorous in
seeking some indication of real changes likely to result from cases
and are cautious in supporting litigation proposals. On the other
hand, if there is to be litigation, they support "pro-active" structural
cases, believing that challenges to business conduct leave structure un-
changed and are a waste of time and effort. According to Katzmann,
these disagreements between economists and lawyers occur in part be-
cause economists believe their professional prestige and future career
advancement depend on a reputation of opposition to unwarranted
government interference in the free market. Lawyers tend to be more
prosecution minded because their career 'prospects appear to depend
on trial experience.
3 7
I doubt that career patterns are that clearly different; many econo-
mists now leave the Commission to join consulting firms in which liti-
gation experience is increasingly valuable. But whatever the reasons
for the tensions that have occurred, Katzmann draws accurate conclu-
sions. Commission economists have had far more to say about case
selection and prosecution, they have frequently opposed traditional
Commission initiatives, and their outlook has reinforced the move-
ment toward pro-active, structural cases. Also, the process of rigorous
review and occasional challenge by economists has forced Bureau of
Competition lawyers to think through their proposals more thoroughly.
There is a tendency in a bureaucracy for the working staff to com-
promise disagreements before they make proposals to the controlling
commissioner, administrator, or secretary, downplaying lines of ar-
gument that were important in their early thinking. The FTC econ-
omists have played something of a devil's advocate role and, in the
process, have sharpened important issues for Commission review.
Finally, Katzmann notes that a sensible policy of seeking more com-
36. FTC, THE MERGER MOVEMENT, A SUMMARY REPORT (1948); FTC, REPORT ON THE
PRESENT TREND OF CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS, S. Doc. No. 17, 80th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1947); FTC, Report on Blue-Sky Securities (1929) (unpublished report submitted
to Congress in Federal Trade Commission Library); see Markham, The Federal Trade
Commission's Use of Economics, 64 CoLum. L. Rv. 405, 412-13 (1964).
37. P. 51.
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plex and innovative antitrust cases could only be implemented if there
were accompanying reforms in the agency's organization. Indica-
tions of the possibility of these kinds of cases emerge from a review
of the consumer price index, indicating high profit sectors of the econ-
omy, and from studies of industrial concentration. It would be too
much to expect young lawyers fresh from law school to develop such
projects; in pro-active cases, the planning is from the top down. That
kind of planning, along with the complex cases that result, has be-
come feasible as a result of a number of bureaucratic reforms: first,
the accumulation of all antitrust efforts into a single Bureau headed
by a single Bureau Director; second, the development of separate
Agency and Bureau planning offices with responsibilities to examine
the economy for instances of inadequate performance and to explore
the possibility that antitrust enforcement could improve the situation;
third, the inclusion of economists at early planning stages of case
development. Perhaps most significantly, there have been constant in-
dications of a receptivity and willingness at the Commission level to
take on the toughest antitrust problems that can be found.
IV
Where does the FTC go from here? Katzmann reviews and rejects
some standard reform proposals-simplification of procedures, con-
tracting for the services of private attorneys, and increased reliance
on rulemaking instead of case-by-case enforcement-because they are
unlikely to make any real difference.39 He considers the possibility
of eliminating the antitrust function of the FTC in favor of exclusive
enforcement by the Department of Justice, but rejects the proposal
for reasons I think are correct. 40 The FTC was established in 1914
because Congress believed that antitrust enforcement should not be
entrusted exclusively to the executive branch or explored exclusively
before federal judges. The FTC was designed to be somewhat closer
to Congress and available to conduct its investigations and studies
even though they might run counter to administration policy. Also,
there are some special advantages to enforcement of the antitrust
laws by an administrative agency, in particular, its capacity to inte-
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through conventional cases but through information gathering, rule-
making, guides, and economic reports. The prosecution-oriented An-
titrust Division of the Department of Justice is equally capable of
following some of these options, but over the years it has not done
so to the same extent as the FTC.
The combination of prosecutorial and judicial functions in a single
agency and the potentially broad sweep of its authority to challenge
"unfair methods of competition," though, is still troublesome. Be-
cause its jurisdiction overlaps almost completely with that of the
Department of Justice, proposals to eliminate the FTC's antitrust au-
thority will be floated constantly, particularly when it takes on con-
troversial projects. The Commission's antitrust functions will be sub-
jected to comprehensive review in the coming year,41 and significant
changes in its mandate and procedures may emerge. A comprehensive
review of the Commission's antitrust role is certainly in order, and
the results are far from certain. But unless and until the country
elects to replace the antitrust policy altogether, it seems a good bet
that an FTC, despite its acknowledged flaws and occasional failures,
will remain on the scene.
Whether the Commission's style of enforcement should remain the
same is a different matter. Katzmann believes "Big Case" pro-active
efforts are likely to continue.42 But that does not mean they cannot
be focused more sharply by careful precomplaint analysis. In many
situations anticompetitive industry problems can be challenged with-
out simultaneously reviewing every aspect of competition in the mar-
ket or suing every company. A trend toward manageable cases and
more narrowly focused complaints is probably the most pronounced
change in antitrust enforcement in the year or two since Katzmann
completed his study.
As noted earlier, another possible change could occur at the bor-
ders where competition policy cuts across other economic goals. The
world grows smaller in competitive terms and complicated national
economic policies intersect increasingly; as a result, it may be that
some conventional antitrust problems can be better addressed in a
nonlitigation context. In summing up, Katzmann indicates a similar
view when he suggests that the Commission's "Big Case" efforts might
be supplemented through an increased commitment of resources to
information gathering and the publication of studies and reports.
43
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One common problem with both economic and legal analyses of com-
petitive issues is that they may have become too parochial, too iso-
lated, too segregated in a separate jargon and point of view. It just
may not be possible to look at competitive problems in automobiles,
steel, and shoe manufacturing, to cite some obvious examples, as if
the values underlying the Sherman, Clayton, and Federal Trade Com-
mission Acts exhausted all relevant considerations. If that is right and
if future antitrust policy, to be effective, must integrate previously
excluded values, the FTC, with the special advantages of an admin-
istrative agency, could have a large role to play in the development
of antitrust policy.
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